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FILE:

WAC 03 030 51459

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION:

Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to

Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C)

### ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



#### **INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office **DISCUSSION:** The Director, California Service Center, denied the employment-based petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of California in February 1999. It distributes ceramic tile. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its purchasing manager. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager.

The director determined that the petitioner had not established: (1) a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer; or (2) its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered annual wage of \$48,000.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief in response to the director's decision.

Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part:

- (1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C):
  - (C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive.

The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary.

A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5).

The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established a qualifying relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. In order to qualify for this visa classification, the petitioner must establish that a qualifying relationship exists between the United States and foreign entities in that the petitioning company is the same employer or an affiliate or subsidiary of the foreign entity. See section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act.

The petitioner has submitted evidence that the bound own 100 percent of the foreign entity and 60 percent of the United States entity. The director determined that since the same parent or individual did not own both entities or that the same group of individuals, each owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each share, did not own both entities, an affiliate relationship did not exist.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) states in pertinent part:

#### Affiliate means:

- (A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or individual;
- (B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity.

*Multinational* means that the qualifying entity, or its affiliate, or subsidiary, conducts business in two or more countries, one of which is the United States.

Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity.

To establish eligibility in this case, it must be shown that the foreign employer and the petitioning entity share common ownership and control. Control may be "de jure" by reason of ownership of 51 percent of outstanding stocks of the other entity or it may be "de facto" by reason of control of voting shares through partial ownership and possession of proxy votes. *Matter of Hughes*, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982).

In this matter owns a majority interest in the petitioner and owns 100 percent of the foreign entity. If one individual owns a majority interest in a petitioner and a foreign entity, and controls those companies, then the companies will be deemed to be affiliates under the definition even if there are multiple owners. The record does not contain any evidence that the petitioner's majority interest owner has granted control of his majority interest in the petitioner to others. The petitioner has established a qualifying affiliate relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary's foreign employer. The director's decision will be withdrawn as it relates to the issue of qualifying relationship.

The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered annual wage of \$48,000.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

When determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the beneficiary's salary. In the present matter, the petitioner has not provided documentary evidence that it previously paid the beneficiary the proffered annual wage of \$48,000.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay, the AAO will next examine the petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, the court held the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS) had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than on the petitioner's gross income. 623 F. Supp. at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. at 537; see also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. at 1054.

As the petition's priority date falls on November 6, 2002, the AAO must examine the petitioner's tax return for 2002. The petitioner explained that when it responded to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner's 2002 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 had not been filed. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner provides the petitioner's IRS Form 1120 for calendar year 2002. The 2002 IRS Form 1120 presents a net taxable income of \$49,324. The petitioner could pay a proffered wage of \$48,000 per year out of this income. The petitioner has provided sufficient evidence to overcome the director's decision on this issue; thus, the director's decision will be withdrawn as it relates to this issue.

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In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has been met.

**ORDER**: The appeal is sustained.